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Abstract: Should media communication be left to the market, or rather (partly) removed from the market? 
This question is discussed by reconstructing an often-found “standard argument” in the literature on the 
subject. This standard argument states that some form of market-independent media provision is required 
since markets will fail to deliver a specific kind of high quality content conducive to the democratic 
process. This paper argues that the standard argument is defective in several respects. By doing so, it 
reevaluates the way we think about the contribution of the media towards democracy and the role that the 
market is to play in this respect. First, the paper argues that the standard argument's normative premise 
should not be couched in a welfarist theory but in terms of the capabilities that the media should strive to 
realize. Second, it sets the normative expectations of the media’s contribution towards the public sphere 
and democracy at too high a level. Third, the standard argument’s diagnosis of the market’s failure 
incorrectly assumes that the market can never generate the demand for high quality content. An 
alternative, more circumscribed claim about the market’s failure is presented, resting on two more 





Many have held that media communication simply is a commodity, governed by 
familiar laws of the marketplace. As a former chairman of the US Federal 
Communications Comission put it: ‘Television is just another appliance… a toaster with 
pictures.’
1
 The main question of this paper is whether we should agree with this 
diagnosis. Should media communication be left to the market? Or do we have good 
reasons to remove media communication – completely or partly – from the market, and 
to provide it through alternative allocation mechanisms? In terms introduced by Michael 
Walzer, should media communication be a ‘blocked exchange’?
2
 To answer this 




 The present paper is offered in the spirit of an exercise to 
determine whether the media is an example of such a limit.  
 The practical urgency of this question is undeniable. Since their inception, the 
mass media have played a crucial role in setting political agendas, shaping social 
debates and informing the general public. During the 20
th
 century, most democratic 
societies have tried to regulate the media, so that they would perform these functions “in 
the public interest.” For example, in many European countries commercial TV and radio 
was not allowed until the 1980s and public broadcasters had a monopoly position. 
Nowadays, the positions are reversed. After the break-up of these public monopolies the 
audience share of commercial channels relative to public channels rapidly increased. 
Similarly, in the US commercial channels were regulated to provide content of public 
interest, but during the last decades these regulations were relaxed. As a consequence, 
public broadcasting and public interest regulation now are on the defensive. Why spend 
taxpayers’ money on services that are already available on the market? The central point 
of sceptics has been that public intervention, bypassing the market criterion of satisfying 
actual consumer demand is inherently paternalist or elitist. For example, Richard Posner 
polemically remarked that people simply ‘want to be entertained’ and ‘want to be 
confirmed in their beliefs’, so that ‘[b]eing profit-driven, the media respond to the actual 
demands of their audience rather than to the idealized “thirst for knowledge” demand 
posited by public intellectuals and deans of journalism schools.’
4
 
Most political philosophers and social theorists writing about the normative 
justification of media markets have generally been critical of the idea that media 
communication would be a simple commodity. They have argued in favour of limits to 
media markets, often along remarkably similar lines - for convenience sake I will refer 
to their argument as “the standard argument”.
5
 The first, normative premise of the 
standard argument is that consumer preferences should not determine what substantive 
media content is available in a society. Instead a preference-independent normative 
theory has to be adopted, which requires the media to deliver a specific kind of high 
quality content, roughly equal to serious journalism conducive to the well-functioning of 
the democratic process. The second, empirical premise of the standard argument is that 
market-based media will fail to deliver the normatively required kind of media content. 
The conclusion is that some form of market-independent media provision is required.  
 This paper provides a close evaluation of the standard argument. My aim will be 
to show that it is defective in several respects. With respect to the first premise, I accept 
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the central importance of the media for democracy, but argue that this should not be 
couched in a welfarist theory (the media as ‘merit good’). Instead I propose to rely on a 
capability theory identifying those capabilities that the media should strive to realize 
(section 1). Through a close examination of Habermas’ endorsement of the role of the 
media in the public sphere, I will argue that, furthermore, the standard argument sets the 
normative expectations of the media’s contribution to democracy at too high a level. 
The media is best conceived, not as part of the public sphere itself, but as only having a 
supportive role toward that sphere (section 2). With respect to the second premise, I will 
argue that the failure of the market is not as straightforward as is usually thought. The 
standard argument claims that we cannot rely on the market because it merely satisfies 
existing preferences while the normatively desirable content forms new preferences 
rather than satisfying existing ones. I will argue that this claim suffers from a confusion 
of two different kinds of preferences (section 3). Alternatively I offer a more 
circumscribed claim about the market’s failure to deliver the normatively desirable 
content, resting on two contingent types of ‘demand failure’: in case of an emergency 
situation where democratic content is threatened with extinction, and in case of 
acollective action problem with respect to media consumption. At both levels, then, 
there is a case for non-market media, although less sweeping, narrower and more 
conditional than the standard argument acknowledges (section 4). 
 
1. A Normative Theory for the Media 
 
The normative premise of the standard argument is put in terms of the requirement to 
provide specific kinds of media content. This is often elaborated in terms of what 
economists call “merit goods.”
6
 The hallmark of a merit good is that it brings beneficial 
effects (‘positive external effects’) over and above the value that is generated by the 
transaction between a good’s producer and its consumer. The most prominent example 
in the media context is content that keeps the public informed about social and political 
affairs, enables it to form its own opinions on these affairs and to participate in 
discussions about them (hereafter refered to as “democratic content”). One can however 
also think of other types of merit good. For example, some argue that the consumption 
of cultural programs has beneficial effects in civilizing people and increasing empathy 
between them (sometimes all these merit goods are taken together under the heading of 
“edifying content”). Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, there are also “demerit 
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goods”: goods with negative external effects, such as media products with racist, sexist 
or violent content. 
The normative claim cannot simply be that the media should – maximally or 
sufficiently – deliver merit goods and refrain from delivering demerit goods. For 
demerit goods, it remains to be seen whether or not the negative externality should be 
borne by media producers and consumers or by the third party being benefited or 
harmed by the externality.
7
 For example, offensive speech is often constitutionally 
protected through the freedom of speech, even though it provides clear harm to the 
offended person. Similarly, positive effects do not automatically qualify for 
internalization. For example, a country as a whole may prosper economically if part of 
the population has seen a winning match of the national soccer team and this causes a 
consumption boom; but this does not oblige the media to broadcast winning soccer 
games (and refrain from showing lost games). Any normative claim made on behalf of 
(de)merit goods needs additional argumentation to establish a normative requirement in 
its favor. This requires a general theoretical framework and its application to specific 
potential merit goods.    
With respect to the general framework, I propose not to rely on a welfarist 
framework but instead interpret the normative claim in terms of capabilities. Thus 
understood the normative claim of the standard argument will read: the media should 
promote people’s capability to acquire democratic content (I will restrict my attention 
to democratic content, presupposing other merit goods do not qualify
8
). Apart from 
general reasons to prefer capability theories over welfarist ones
9
, there are perspicuouss 
reason to do so in the media context. The production of merit goods by media 
organizations cannot guarantee their consumption by citizens, nor should it do so. If the 
media broadcast democratic content, the realization of the positive welfare effect 
depends on people’s free choice to actually watch this content. The distinction 
fundamental to capability theories between ‘capability’ and ‘functioning’ is well-suited 
to bring out this crucial difference between opportunities to consume and actual 
consumption, the normative importance of promoting capabilities, not functionings, so 
that people have the freedom to decide whether or not to function in the relevant way. 
People cannot be coerced to actually consume democratic media content. Also, a 
capability formulation of the normative premise fits better with the awareness in 
communication studies that the reception of a message by an audience is not 
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unproblematic or self-evident. The actual consumption (functioning) may not be 
identical to what the producer (sender) of the message intended.
10
  
A cautionary note is in place. That it is objectionable to legally coerce people to 
watch certain media content doesn’t mean that a normative conclusion to the extent that 
people should actually consume democratic content is foreclosed by the adoption of a 
capability framework. A capability theory is not committed to the argument that 
capabilities should always be endorsed instead of actual functionings. Rather, the 
capability framework is valuable for giving us the distinction between both (thus adding 
analytical clarity compared to a welfarist framework). Even though this distinction is 
often introduced to support normative arguments that capabilities should promoted, in 
principle the distinction leaves open the question whether in a particular context 
capabilities or rather functionings should be promoted. As we will see, this is important 
for the justification of non-market media, which will partly rely on promoting 
capabilities, partly on promoting functionings (see section 4). 
This reformulation in terms of capabilities has not yet given us a reason to 
endorse the normative premise. To do that, we need a normative criterion that 
distinguishes normatively valid from invalid claims. If a capability is to have normative 
force, we need to establish that it somehow is a ‘basic capability’; something that 
deserves promotion. As a criterion to distinguish basic – or as I will say, “morally 
required” – from non basic – or merely “morally permissible” – capabilities, I will use 
the capacity for agency.
 
Only those capabilities which are necessary to make people into 
autonomous agents deserve to be listed in a moral theory that requires these capabilities 
to be realized.
11
 Thus, the capability to acquire democratic media content is to be 
classified as belonging to the category of morally required capabilities if it is somehow a 
necessary condition for individuals to develop their capacity for agency.
12
 
The next step is to apply this general framework to the capability to acquire 
democratic media content: is this a morally required capability? A positive answer to 
that question can be defended in either of two different ways. One form of justification 
is to argue that to have this capability is a necessary condition for anyone to be a person. 
Following this line of thought opportunities for benefiting from media content that 
enhance the quality of one’s democratic participation are valued intrinsically. Edwin 
Baker relies on this type of justification where he suggests that people’s collective 
preference for non-market media can be justified by the fact that “many people would 
like to be reflective, more self-reliant, more politically energized, more responsive to the 
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needs of others, and more interested in being informed.”
13
 This is a rather strong claim. 
It may be the case that for some people these opportunities are crucial to become the 
person they would like to be. For many others, however, participation in the public 
sphere does not play an important role in their self-conception, nor is there a convincing 
argument that it should do so. For example, what about people spending their life in 
obsessive engagement with art, sports or science, without any interest in social and 
political issues? Would they be agents to a lesser extent? That seems hard to defend. 
It seems more promising to turn to an instrumental type of justification. People 
need to have the capability to acquire democratic content, for it provides them with the 
opportunity to participate in the public sphere, which makes this sphere function well. 
This in turn is necessary to enhance the quality of decision making in formal democratic 
bodies and to have checks against these bodies. A well-functioning democracy is 
required because this form of government has – at least in complex modern societies – 
the best chances of creating a society in which people can become full agents and have 
equal standing.
14
 Thus, the capability to acquire democratic media content is required as 
a prerequisite for the well-functioning of the type of political system that is best placed 
to promote each person’s capacity for agency. Admittedly, this is a rather abstract 
argument. Therefore I will hereafter take a closer look at the relations between the 
media, the public sphere and democracy, scrutinizing arguably the most influential 




Before doing so, the sketch of our normative theory of the media needs one 
addition. For the media do not only deliver democratic content, but also non-democratic 
or – for brevity’s sake – “entertaining content”.
16
 Should our normative theory include 
an imperative for people to have a capability to such content? Arguably, the media 
should be allowed to let viewers have their daily portion of soap series, quizzes and 
sports matches. None of these activities can be labeled as immoral. Neither can they be 
considered morally required, however, for it is difficult to see what entertainment would 
add to the development of agency. They are morally permissible. This classification is 
important, for in cases of conflict the realization of morally required capabilities takes 
priority over morally permissible capabilities. To the extent that it is practically 
impossible to promote both, the promotion of the capability for entertaining content will 
have to yield to the higher-order capability to acquire democratic content. Nonetheless, 
the non-democratic capability represents a separate source of normative claims on the 
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media, even if only of the permissible kind. This is important, since our main question is 
about the suitability of the market mechanism for the media context. Since it is rather 
uncontroversial that the market is best equipped to realize entertaining content, we can 
now conclude that media products should not be “blocked exchanges;” there is a 
legitimate scope for market-based media. The difficult matter is whether the capability 
to acquire democratic content can also be satisfied in a market context or requires non-
market media. 
 
2. The Media and The Public Sphere 
 
In this section I will argue for a specific relation of the media to democracy on the basis 
of a close reading of Habermas’ book on the public sphere.
17
 I draw from it two 
different theses about the effects of the mass media on the public sphere and democracy. 
This will lead me to formulate more precisely the extent to which the media is able to 
support the public sphere and democracy. I will focus on Habermas’ earlier work 
because this text displays the features that are important to my argument in the most 
exemplary fashion. To keep the discussion tractable, I will only briefly suggest how this 
relates to his later work on the media at the end of this section.  
Following Habermas’s original study on the subject, the ideal of the public 
sphere is the ideal of a sphere of rational-critical debate on the part of citizens 
deliberating among each other. This sphere arose in the 18
th
 century as the rising 
bourgeois class emancipated itself from the state and started to discuss political and 
administrative matters. Discussions were not confined to politics; cultural and literary 
matters were equally prominent, as the public sphere provided the opportunity to discuss 
the new experience of subjectivity that simultaneously entered the sphere of the private 
bourgeois household.
18
 The English coffee houses, the French salons and the German 
Tischgesellschaften were the prototype institutional platforms of this public sphere, but 
the role of the media was also essential. The press initially emerged in response to the 
needs of merchants engaged in long-distance trade: along with intensified traffic came 
the need for traffic in news. In a second step, many of the “political journals” fell into 
the hands of state authorities who used them to make public their decrees and control 
the stream of information. Only in the third instance these journals came to exhibit 




From this point on, two quite different themes can be stressed. The first theme, 
dominant in Habermas’s account – and in media scholars following him – is that the 
market subsequently captured the media. Once controlled by capitalist interests, the 
media actively contributed to the decline of the public sphere. I will call this the “market 
subversion” thesis. A second theme, more subterranean in Habermas, is that the mass 
media in and by themselves, i.e. even when abstracted from their market-based 
organization, subverted the public sphere. I will call this the “media subversion” thesis. 
It is necessary to keep both theses analytically separated, even though in empirical 
reality they may be intertwined.  
According to the market subversion thesis, the market initially had a beneficial 
influence on the public sphere because it provided the means through which people 
could participate in the public sphere (books, journals, theater tickets, etc.). After a 
while, however, the media turned against the public sphere and commodified culture 
and critical debate itself, transforming it to fit prepackaged formats easily digestible by 
large audiences. As Habermas writes, ‘Today the conversation itself is administered. 
Professional dialogues from the podium, panel discussions, and round table shows – the 
rational debate of private people becomes one of the production numbers of the stars in 
radio and television, a salable package ready for the box office; it assumes commodity 
form even at “conferences” where anyone can “participate.”’
20
 
The underlying mechanism that Habermas identifies is that the standards of 
debate are lowered so that a broad audience has access, but what it has access to in no 
way resembles the original ideal of a public sphere in which participants discussed 
social and political issues freely. The market not only gave the masses economic access 
to cultural goods, but ‘it also facilitated access for broad strata psychologically.’ As a 
consequence, ‘[t]his expanded public sphere, however, lost its political character to the 
extent that the means of “psychological facilitation” could become an end in itself for a 
commercially fostered consumer attitude.’
21
 When explaining why the media would 
want to transform the public sphere in the way described, Habermas refers to the advent 
of “the advertising business” that in the course of the 19
th
 century came to dominate the 
internal organization of the media.
22
  
 If we follow the media subversion thesis, the picture is rather different. In 
Habermas’s account, the direct and live discussions in coffee houses (and their present 
day equivalents) are emblematic for the interactions in the public sphere. If this is so, 
then the mass media must always misrepresent the nature of that sphere. Debate in the 
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media is always staged, artificially constructed. Whether a TV show is organizing a 
debate around a social issue of the day or a journalist interviews citizens on matters of 
public policy; the form and content of the resulting exchange is always in the hands of 
the media provider. The provider selects the topic, the guests, the questions etc. From 
this perspective media communications cannot escape being a product. It is always a 
constructed item that is communicated, not the representation of a spontaneous 
discussion with open access for all. This product nature of media communication is 




When Habermas tells us that in the early days of the public sphere this was 
otherwise, we see how the media’s being part of the public sphere depends on a very 
peculiar setting. For here Habermas describes the functioning of weekly periodicles that 
were so localized and small-scale that they could be considered as adjuncts (“integral 
parts”) to the live discussions in the public sphere.
24
 But these journals are only vaguely 
reminiscent of today’s mass media; they look more like websites destined to (and 
accessed only by) members of a specific club. From this perspective, the tale of the 
decline of the public sphere emphasizes a rather different development: the decline of 
the original discussions in the coffee houses due to the rise of state bureaucracies, 
special interest groups and political parties that closed the void between the private 
sphere and the state. This in turn provoked a new role for the media, much better 
integrated with their large-scale technological expansion on a commercial basis; that of 




The difference between these two explanatory accounts is crucial for the 
market’s relation to the ideal of a public sphere. If the market subversion thesis is 
correct, then the media’s role in sustaining a public sphere can in principle be salvaged, 
by taking the media out of the hands of commercial (advertising) interests. The state 
could take over the media and establish public broadcasting.
26
 If the media subversion 
thesis is correct, however, then there is no escape from private interests. The 
“administration of conversation” will happen anyhow, not only when the media is taken 
over by the market, but also when media products are manufactured through alternatives 
such as state provision. A non-market-based mass media will also be dominated by 
groups who capture the relevant organizations. The objection against the market then 
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reduces to the market’s administration of conversations in favor of commercial interests 
rather than other (potentially more benign?) interests.  
We could also try to reconcile both theses, treating them not as mutually 
exclusive but as mutually reinforcing explanations. The media subversion thesis forces 
us to admit that the real public sphere always occurs outside of the manufacturing of the 
media’s products. Nonetheless, just as a vibrant public sphere is an indirect warrant for 
the quality of decision making in the official political sphere, the media are an indirect 
testimony to the civic debate in the public sphere. The media support the debate in the 
public sphere in their products. In this supportive function, the media channels 
information from the society at large to the formal political arenas and vice versa. It 
informs citizens about the plans of political actors, communicates about political 
deliberations, exposes corruption within political bodies, etc. At the same time it 
informs political bodies about the desires and actions of citizens within the public 
sphere.  
Thus formulated the ambition is more modest, not claiming a role for the media 
that it cannot fulfill.
27
 Its supportive role would still be quite ambitious, however, in 
aiming at a representation unhindered by commercial or other particular interests 
(including state interests!), driven only by the wish to reflect what is going on among 
the public and in formal political decision-making bodies. At this point the market 
subversion thesis shows this supportive role is endangered as soon as commercial 
interests predominate.  
It remains somewhat unclear whether a reading of Habermas’ work after his 
early Structural Transformation affirms or denies this conclusion. In a 2006 article 
Habermas seems to throw all the blame for the artificial construction of debate on the 
market’s influence.
28
 In this account the market intrudes the media, which in itself is 
characterized by an emancipatory potential. The groundwork for this construction is 
arguably laid in the 1980s Theory of Communicative Action, where Habermas subsumes 
the mass media under the category of ‘generalized forms of communication’ (i.e. 
influence and value commitment) rather than the steering media (money and power), 
and stresses the emancipatory potential of the mass media.
29
 In an article on the public 
sphere from 1992, however, we find Habermas faulting both the media’s own ever-more 
centralized logic and the market’s influence for weakening the public sphere.
30
 The 
same line arguably is taken in Between Facts and Norms (1996).
31
 These texts support 
the juxtaposition of the market subversion thesis and the media subversion thesis.  
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This latter argumentative strategy is in line with my position. However, there 
remains one point of dispute. Habermas still articulates very ambitious normative claims 
for the mass media.
32
 In contrast, my position here is that even if the market doesn’t 
have any influence in the media, the normative role to be attributed of the media in 
supporting the public sphere will have to be more modest than Habermas’ version of the 
standard argument allows.   
 
3. Media and the Market 
 
Now I turn to the second premise of the standard argument, that the market is unable to 
promote the required capability; that it will tend to offer too little – if any – democratic 
content. Sometimes an explanation of such low levels is sought on the supply side. For 
producers, it is often more attractive to produce non-democratic content. The costs of 
producing a soap opera are lower than the costs of producing high-quality drama and the 
costs of producing investigative journalism are higher than the costs of newsroom 
interviews.
33
 However, if consumers would press hard enough, it seems that cost 
problems could be overcome. It is telling that even if democratic content is offered free 
of charge – for example on public television – it attracts substantially smaller audiences 
than non-democratic content. This shows that the problem doesn’t predominantly lie on 
the supply side. Economies of scale make it attractive to produce democratic content at 
sufficient levels once it is in wide demand, so there must also be explanations why 
demand is lacking.  
The standard argument argues for the lack of demand by employing a distinction 
between preference satisfaction and preference formation. Media content either caters to 
existing preferences (preference satisfaction) or leads to the establishment of new 
preferences (preference formation). Democratic content typically triggers a process of 
preference formation on the part of receivers. It stimulates a creation of preferences 
about objects which were formerly not included in one’s preference ordering and aims 
to challenge existing beliefs, so that people are required to consider a revision of 
previously held preferences. Consumers will not exercise (sufficient) demand for this 
kind of preference-forming content since their preference for it can only be formed by 
already consuming it. And because consumers don’t demand democratic content, 
market-based media will not offer it and confine themselves to content that appeals to 
people’s wishes to have their actual preferences satisfied. For example, Russell Keat 
 12 
argues that ‘[t]elevision “ratings wars” provide plentiful examples, with programmes 
carefully constructed to provide audiences with “just what they (happen to) want,” 
forcing out others which, by virtue of their transformative value, present something to 
their audiences which may challenge those preferences.
34
 
On the basis of this premise, combined with the previously discussed normative 
premise, the standard argument concludes that a collective decision should be made to 
provide non-market media. Such a decision shouldn’t be seen as illegitimately 
overriding people’s preferences (paternalism), for preferences are (partly) a function of 
the setting in which they are expressed. The content of preferences expressed in the 
market and that of preferences raised in a process of collective decision making may 
therefore legitimately diverge. By expressing a preference for the provision of 




In my view this argument must be rejected. I can see no reason why a media 
consumer couldn’t express a demand for media content which is ‘transformative’ of her 
beliefs in social and political matters, helping her to reflect on issues important to actual 
democratic deliberations. ‘Preference formation’ itself can be considered as a property 
of certain types of media content (‘democratic content’), and consumuers can demand 
content which has that property. Just as consumers can demand to be entertained they 
can demand to be challenged in their beliefs. Whether or not they are likely to ask for 
such transformative content is another matter; but there is no principled obstacle here. 
The fact that many consumers do ask high quality content (e.g. for newspapers) proves 
this point. A defender of market-based media might therefore argue that the market is 
very well capable to cater to the demand for democratic content to a sufficient extent. 
She could in support introduce the following thought experiment.  
Imagine that ideal-typically the media market consists of two types of 
consumers. The first type has a preference for democratic content, but is in the dark 
about which media goods contain this kind of content. Consequently these consumers 
may fail to exercise a demand, even though they have the required preference. Call a 
person suffering from this problem the democratic-content-seeking consumer. The 
problem arises because most media goods are either “experience goods” or “credence 
goods.”
36
 For experience goods, one has to become acquainted with their content to 
know their value. Only after consuming it for some time one knows its value. A soap 
series is an experience good. With credence goods one cannot evaluate their value, even 
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after consumption. The daily news is a credence good. It is difficult to evaluate its 
accuracy in reporting on “reality” since one watches it precisely to learn about the state 
of reality. Both types of goods lead to an information problem. Here the market however 
may provide a solution, through the possibility for producers of establishing a 
reputation. Review sites, consumer organizations and independent prizes may all help to 
inform consumers which providers serve their mission well. Thus, the reputation 
mechanism helps consumers to act upon their preferences by buying media content from 
providers reputed to deliver the desired content. If one prefers being a better-informed 
citizen, one can take a subscription to “Citizen Channel.” Democratic-content-seeking 
consumers are auto-paternalist but the market serves their auto-paternalism well.  
A second type of consumer is simply too lazy, short-sighted or occupied to 
purchase democratic media content. Whatever the exact motivation, he has no 
preference to that end. The problem of these uninterested consumers does not originate 
in a purported lack of information. They know it would be socially better if they 
consumed democratic content; nonetheless they neglect their capability to acquire 
democratic content. They may complement this attitude with two different policy 
stances. Either they prefer to have democratic content available to all (delivered by non-
market media, financed by taxpayers), as an insurance scheme in case of the unlikely 
event that they relieve themselves of their own lack of motivation; or – more likely – 
they refuse supporting such a scheme and give up on their prospects for preference 
formation with regard to democratic content altogether. The existence of the latter group 
raises a dilemma: should we coerce them into collective payments for the supply of 
democratic content or respect their autonomous wish not to be involved? If we grant 
these persons their way of life (as it seems we should), then the market gives them all 
they want. Collective action for non-market media cannot be justified on the basis of 
this group of consumers.  
Proponents of a completely market-based media will say that the two groups of 
consumers exactly represent the actual media audience. Either consumers are auto-
paternalist and the market can help them out or they are not auto-paternalist and then 
democratic content needs to be offered outside of the market, but this qualifies as real, 
unjustified paternalism. Some are spontaneously interested in watching democratic 
content and find the market rewarding their demand; others are not interested and 
should be left alone. The morally required capability to acquire democratic content is 
safeguarded by the market, since market demand expressed by the first group creates 
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supply of democratic content, so that those from the second group have supply available 
in case they change their mind. 
 
4. A Limited Justification for Non-Market Media 
 
Is there a way around this conclusion? Can the standard argument be saved? I think it 
can, but only to a limited extent. In this section I will argue that there is a justification 
for non-market provision of democratic content, in two narrowly circumscribed 
circumstances. It is worth noticing at the outset that the justification is contingent on 
these circumstances actually obtaining. The market need not fail.  
The first situation is where, due to whatever reasons, democratic content is 
threatened with extinction. This occurs where the actual level of market supply is so low 
that we cannot reasonably expect prospective consumers to be able to find this content 
and become acquainted with its value through consumption. For example, if markets – 
on the basis of actual demand – would only provide one hour of serious political 
discussion a week, this is probably insufficient to become accustomed and develop a 
taste for it. In these circumstances the market fails to realize the capability to acquire 
democratic content to a meaningful extent. A fall below this threshold justifies provision 
of non-market media. This justification could be rightfully invoked at an imaginary 
“first day” of a society, where citizens have no recollection of democratic content 
whatsoever (for example, after a revolution overturning decades of dictatorship and state 
propaganda); or a society that has suffered a very gradual but ultimately near-to-
complete erosion of the demand for democratic content. At any rate, this justification 
applies to a kind of emergency situation where the level provided by the market is too 
low. It will not obtain very often; normally market supply will be above this level. 
A further-ranging justification arises in a second type of situation, in which 
market supply of democratic content is higher than this emergency level, but lower than 
the level needed to make the public sphere function properly. The emergency level may 
be too low for this because it only ensures consumption of democratic content by a 
small niche of dedicated citizens. For a proper functioning of the public sphere, wider 
citizen participation may be needed. This diagnosis changes the normative claim itself. 
In this situation, the reason for justifying attempts to push consumption to a higher level 
by taking collective action simultaneously at both sides – raising the level of supply and 
trying to stimulate demand – can only be found in an independent requirement for high 
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levels of actual consumption. We do not rest content with a situation in which everyone 
has the capability to acquire democratic content but few convert it into functioning. A 
sufficient level of functioning is now required. Thus, this second type of justification 
presupposes that the public sphere needs an active citizenry of democratic content 
consuming citizens. Supposing this to be the case, let us see how the argument could be 
developed. 
The justification for providing non-market content up to this higher level can 
best be explained by a criticism of the market proponent’s thought experiment from the 
previous section. In addition to the democratic-content-seeking consumer and the 
uninterested consumer, we introduce a third ideal-type consumer, who has adequate 
information about the reputation of providers and is not uninterested. However, he does 
not want to engage in consuming democratic content if others do not do the same. This 
calculating consumer conspicuously observes other citizens’ behavior before deciding 
to watch democratic content. Elizabeth Anderson explains the general problem his 
general attitude gives rise to: ‘Because markets don’t give consumers control over 
others’ decisions, they tend not to be effective vehicles for satisfying the preferences 
individuals have that are conditional on their confidence that a large number of other 
people will behave likewise. Call these large-scale conditional preferences.’
37
 
  If the preference for democratic content is a large-scale conditional preference, 
this may seem to save the case for non-market media.
38
 For now we can explain the lack 
of market demand for such content by reference to the classical free-rider problem. The 
consumption of democratic content is a civic duty media consumers will only bear if 
they receive signals that others are doing their part. This would explain why many 
consumers do not grasp the opportunity to become acquainted with democratic content 
through consumption of content already available (as a response to the demand 
expressed by the small group of democratic-content-seeking consumers). For they think 
their individual contribution will not have much of an effect on the overall quality of the 
public sphere.  
This solution faces a problem of its own. It assumes collective action will be 
effective in remedying the individual’s motivational defect. With normal examples of 
collective action problems this assumption is relatively unproblematic. For example, 
citizens can decide to correct their consumer preferences for products whose price 
doesn’t internalize negative pollution externalities by forcing producers to obey 
environmental regulations. Or they can protect themselves against the consumption of 
 16 
unhealthy products by severely restricting opportunities for their sale and consumption 
(e.g. smoking in public places). For the media, however, citizen action at the level of 
policy making cannot on its own resolve the collective action problem. Here individuals 
have to take up their citizen role at two levels. First at the political level they have to 
make a collective decision; and then at the level of media consumption they have to 
actually watch the collectively established content. Even if people vote for producing 
democratic content (e.g. by a public broadcaster) this doesn’t guarantee they actually 
watch it sitting at home. Normally collective action is effectively designed as a legal 
obligation backed up with sanctions; smokers in public buildings and polluting firms are 
penalized for their behavior. For the media, a collective decision to provide democratic 
media content is insufficient as long as media consumers cannot be penalized when not 
actually watching (in the absence of a media police force intruding their homes, forcing 
them to watch…).  
This dependence on voluntary action is partly a blessing. After all, a defining 
characteristic of civic virtue is that it involves taking upon oneself civic obligations 
voluntarily; without strategically waiting for assurances that others will move too. In 
this regard, the obligation of citizens to inform themselves and reflect upon political 
affairs with the help of media content is analogous to the obligation of voting. One is 
supposed to engage in it not because others do so, but because one wants to be member 
of a community in which others do so for that very same reason. The voluntary nature of 
the additional effort needed on the part of the citizen is a constitutive part of the end 
goal (the establishment of a democratic society); not   a merely instrumentally necessary 
effort that one may abstain from in the absence of simultaneous efforts by others. The 
flip side of this coin is that the collective effort to provide democratic content is 
vulnerable to disintegration. When some abstain from watching democratic content, 
others will wonder why they themselves should keep on paying the required taxes and 
watch. Arguably, other policy measures (like education) will then be required to 




This paper has argued for several revisions of the standard argument about the 
justification of non-market media. The normative claim was formulated as a claim about 
the capability to acquire democratic content, the substance of this claim implying a more 
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modest role for the media in supporting the public sphere than usually acknowledged. 
The second premise of the standard argument was transformed into a more 
circumscribed picture of two specific occasions on which the market will fail to provide 
democratic content. This led to a limited and conditional justification for non-market 
media. This leaves the following tasks ahead. 
First, the two justifications for non-market media are contingent on the portrayed 
circumstances actually obtaining. Strictly speaking, this assumes one would have to wait 
until supply actually falls below one of the two levels before one starts providing non-
market content. If one is somewhat less strict, one can also argue non-market provision 
should be delivered prospectively, as a precautionary measure, because it would be too 
harmful if democratic content actually falls below one of these levels. Only if we grant 
such a relaxation we can argue in favour of permanent regulation or public broadcasting. 
But this relaxation is not innocent, for it harbors the danger that non-market provision 
continues for long periods of time when there would be no justification for it (because in 
the counterfactual situation levels of market demand for democratic content would have 
been high enough). Therefore, more argument is needed to make this leap from the 
presently offered justification to such a permanent scheme based on a precautionary 
argument. 
Second, the line of thought offered in the third and fourth sections has 
presupposed a somewhat abstract picture of markets obeying standard laws of supply 
and demand. In this abstract model democratic content only becomes available to the 
extent that consumers ask for it. Actual market configurations may diverge from this 
standard in different ways. Our conclusions would have to be modified to the extent that 
the supply of democratic content is different from what the abstract model would 
dictate. For example, some media suppliers may offer more democratic content than is 
strictly asked for by consumers, since they feel it their social responsibility to do so, or 
because they have the financial means to make a loss on it. They might use cross-
subsidization (as publishing houses sometimes do with their books), paying for 
democratic content out of the profits made on entertaining content. Another factor might 
be that markets in small countries may have more difficulty to deliver democratic 
content than larger countries (given economies of scale), making the case for non-
market provision in these countries easier to make than in larger countries. These and 
other differences in market configurations will have to be taken into account to fine-tune 
the conclusions to be drawn from the general argument offered in this paper. 
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Third, it is still open whether non-market provision should take the form of 
public regulation of private media or of public provision by a public broadcaster. 
Arguments can be given for both these main options (and several variations thereof). 
This issue cannot be resolved on the basis of the justificatory question dealt with here. 
This paper has merely provided the groundwork for a debate on the more specific 
institutional form of non-market provision. Finally, this also leaves ahead the task of 
identifying conflicts with market-based media, usually but not exclusively specialising 
in all kinds of entertaining content. A solution for these conflicts requires both 
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